2026 closure comparison: the numbers
The table below tracks confirmed closures from public earnings reports, court filings, and press coverage as of June 2026. Counts are directional — many brands report ranges or targets rather than finalized lists.
| Brand | Closures | Primary driver | Buyer angle |
|---|---|---|---|
7-Eleven North America · 2024–2026 ongoing | 645 | Portfolio optimization; parent Seven & i restructuring ahead of delayed IPO; underperforming urban and fuel sites | Territory re-opening in dense urban markets; Speedway integration creates refranchising candidates |
GameStop U.S. · Announced Q1 2026 | 400+ | Retail traffic decline; shift to digital distribution; new CEO turnaround plan focuses on collectibles and smaller-format stores | Limited franchise angle — mostly corporate stores; watch for lease/asset sales in strip-center locations |
Wendy's U.S. · 2026–2027 | 298–358 | Underperformer pruning; new CEO Bob Wright (ex-Potbelty) portfolio review; design-age and sales-volume thresholds | Distressed resale inventory likely; watch for territory re-opening in secondary markets; diligence why specific units failed |
Papa Johns Global · 2026–2027; 200 in 2026 | ~300 (200 in 2026) | North America comp-sales decline; international market exits; post-CEO-transition portfolio rationalization | Closing units may signal oversaturated pizza markets; verify territory density before buying into nearby locations |
Jack in the Box U.S. · 2026 | 150–200 | Post-Del Taco sale portfolio cleanup; underperforming legacy locations; California wage pressure | California closures may re-open territories for competitors; Del Taco integration risk for remaining operators |
Carl's Jr. California · 2026 | 49 | Sun Gir LLC franchisee liquidation; cited California $20/hr minimum wage as primary factor | Franchisee bankruptcy creating bulk site availability in California; wage economics remain the structural question |
Noodles & Co. U.S. · 2026 | 30–35 | Underperforming suburban locations; menu simplification strategy; shift to smaller-format and catering-forward model | Small count but indicates fast-casual segment stress; watch for adjacent brand closures in same strip centers |
Red Robin U.S. · 2026 | 30 (refranchised) | Refranchising 30 company-owned units at ~$783K/unit; reducing corporate-operated footprint | Refranchised units at $783K may be below replacement cost; diligence four-wall economics and lease terms before buying |
On The Border U.S. (company-owned); ~5 franchise units remain · June 12, 2026 | ~30 (all corporate) | Post-Chapter 11 shutdown; Pappas Restaurants acquired chain out of March 2025 bankruptcy, then closed all remaining corporate locations June 12, 2026; brand stated it is 'evaluating future and strategic options' | Brand survival in question; ~5 remaining franchisees face uncertain support, marketing, and supply chain — extreme franchisor-risk case study |
Freddy's (M&M Custard) Illinois; 31 legacy units outside IL continued operating · Filed late 2025; closures 2025–2026 | 11 (Illinois) | Market-porting failure: M&M Custard, a top Freddy's operator, acquired Chicago market development rights and built four high-visibility locations that failed to gain traction; Illinois units averaged <$900K revenue vs >$1.5M for non-Illinois units; Chapter 11 used to reject 11 toxic Illinois leases while retaining the profitable 31-unit legacy base ($48.4M annual revenue); $5M assets / $28M liabilities | The definitive market-porting cautionary tale: a proven operator with a proven brand still failed because local brand awareness and unit volumes could not justify the lease commitments. Area-development agreements can push franchisees into markets where the concept has no track record. Underwrite per-unit revenue in the target market before signing any area development commitment. |
7-Eleven: the largest single closure program
Seven & i Holdings is closing 645 North American stores as part of a multi-year restructuring ahead of its delayed North American IPO. The closures target underperforming urban sites and legacy fuel locations that do not fit the food-first, fresh-grab-and-go model the chain is building.
For franchise buyers, the 7-Eleven closures matter because they free up territory in dense urban markets where convenience-store competition is fierce. If you are evaluating a c-store franchise, check whether recently closed 7-Eleven locations overlap your target trade area. The answer changes your competitive density, available traffic, and lease negotiation leverage.
Wendy's: new CEO, portfolio cleanup
Wendy's plans to close 298–358 U.S. units under new permanent CEO Bob Wright, named May 20, 2026 after serving as interim chief. The closure program targets locations that fall below design-age, sales-volume, and remodel-cost thresholds — essentially, units that would cost more to update than they can earn back.
Buyer diligence angle: Wendy's closures will create a wave of distressed resale inventory as franchisees exit underperforming locations. Check Wendy's franchise cost and profit profile to understand what a viable unit should look like, and compare against any resale opportunity in a closing territory. The gap between the brand's target unit economics and a closing unit's actual performance is your negotiation room.
Papa Johns: 300 units, global scope
Papa Johns is closing approximately 300 units globally by 2027, with about 200 in 2026. North America comp-sales are declining, and international markets are being pruned to focus on high-performing regions. The closure program follows a CEO transition, broader strategic reset, and a live take-private process with franchisee-backed bid implications.
Pizza is a saturated category. Before buying any pizza franchise territory, check whether a Papa Johns closure nearby reflects market-level weakness (no one wants pizza there) or brand-level weakness (they chose the wrong pizza). The first is a structural problem; the second may be your opportunity.
Jack in the Box and Carl's Jr.: California wage pressure
Jack in the Box is closing 150–200 units following the sale of Del Taco, cleaning up a portfolio that over-expanded through acquisition. Carl's Jr. lost 49 California locations when franchisee Sun Gir LLC liquidated, citing the state's $20/hr fast-food minimum wage as the primary driver.
California closures are a structural story, not a cyclical one. If a location closed because labor costs made it unprofitable at current menu prices, the math does not change for the next operator unless you bring a lower-cost operating model (smaller format, different labor mix, higher throughput per employee).
GameStop: retail format collapse, limited franchise angle
GameStop is closing 400+ stores as part of a turnaround plan focused on collectibles and smaller-format locations. Most GameStop locations are corporate-owned, which limits direct franchise opportunity. The franchise angle here is indirect: strip-center landlords losing GameStop tenants may be motivated to negotiate with replacement tenants, including franchise operators in adjacent categories.
Red Robin: refranchising, not closing
Red Robin is refranchising 30 company-owned units at approximately $783K per unit — below replacement cost for a full-service burger restaurant. This is not a distress closure; it is a capital-light strategy. But buyers should diligence whether the refranchised units have viable lease terms, labor models, and four-wall economics, or whether the brand is shedding locations it does not want to operate itself.
On The Border: post-bankruptcy corporate shutdown
On The Border Mexican Grill & Cantina — a Dallas-founded casual-dining Tex-Mex chain that once operated 150+ restaurants — closed all of its remaining company-owned locations on June 12, 2026, leaving approximately five franchise-operated units across California, Florida, Nevada, South Dakota, and South Korea. The shutdown comes just over a year after Houston-based Pappas Restaurants (parent of Pappadeaux Seafood Kitchen, Pappasito's Cantina, and Pappas Bros. Steakhouse) acquired the chain out of its March 2025 Chapter 11 filing.
The trajectory is instructive: OTB began 2025 with approximately 120 locations, closed 40 in February 2025 before filing, filed Chapter 11 on March 5, was acquired by Pappas in May 2025, and then on June 12, 2026 shuttered all ~30 remaining corporate units in a single day. The company stated it is "currently evaluating the future of the On The Border brand and exploring a range of strategic options."
For franchise buyers, On The Border is a case study in extreme franchisor risk. The ~5 remaining franchisees now operate independently — but without corporate marketing, menu development, supply-chain coordination, or brand investment. This is the terminal end of the spectrum that starts with franchisor financial stress (see our coverage of the franchisee bankruptcy wave, including the Fat Brands franchisor bankruptcy) and ends with brand extinction.
The buyer diligence lesson: emergence from Chapter 11 does not guarantee survival. If you are evaluating any franchise where the franchisor has recent bankruptcy history, check FDD Item 20 for net unit-count trends, Item 6 for franchisor financial health, and whether the franchisor has the resources to support the system long-term. A brand that has already been through one bankruptcy and is still shrinking is not a safe bet — no matter how cheap the franchise fee is.
Freddy's (M&M Custard): the market-porting failure
M&M Custard — one of Freddy's Frozen Custard & Steakburgers' top franchisees — filed Chapter 11 after a failed Chicago market expansion. The operator ran 31 healthy legacy units generating $48.4M in annual revenue (averaging >$1.5M per unit outside Illinois), then acquired market development rights from the franchisor for $1M, bought seven existing stores, and built four high-visibility Chicago locations. The Illinois units averaged <$900K in revenue — roughly 40% below the legacy base — and generated negative EBITDA. M&M used bankruptcy to reject the leases on 11 Illinois locations and preserve the profitable 31-unit legacy portfolio. Total filing: about $5M in assets and $28M in liabilities.
This is the definitive market-porting failure case study for franchise buyers. A proven operator with a proven brand entered what looked like an attractive major market — and lost badly because local brand awareness was insufficient, unit volumes lagged by 40%+, and the lease commitments became unsustainable. The franchisor's $700M acquisition by Rhône Group (reported in 2024) meant a PE-backed parent was overseeing aggressive development targets while the operator bore the downside risk.
Buyer diligence lesson: Area-development agreements can push franchisees into markets where the concept has no consumer track record. Before signing any area development commitment, demand per-unit revenue benchmarks for your target market (not just national averages), verify local brand awareness through independent consumer research, and stress-test whether unit volumes at 60% of the national average can still service the lease. Check how Section 365 bankruptcy mechanics work when leases become toxic assets. See also the franchisee bankruptcy wave for the full M&M Custard filing context.
Buyer diligence checklist for closure territories
Closures create opportunity only when you understand why the unit failed and whether you can fix it. Use this checklist before pursuing any territory that opened up after a closure:
| Question | Why it matters |
|---|---|
| Why did this location close? | Structural market weakness, brand-level problems, operator-specific failure, or lease expiration. The reason matters more than the closure itself. |
| Is the territory re-opening? | Check the FDD Item 12 territory definition and Item 20 outlet status. A closed unit may or may not free up the protected area. |
| What is the distressed resale value? | Closing franchisees or their landlords may sell equipment, lease assignments, or franchise rights at significant discounts to build cost. |
| Did the brand close corporate or franchisee units? | Corporate closures signal the brand is pruning its own portfolio. Franchisee closures may indicate operator economics are broken. |
| What does Item 20 show? | Compare closures to transfers, openings and non-renewals. A brand closing 300 units while opening 100 is net-shrinking — very different from closing 300 while opening 500. |
| Is the closure driver fixable? | Wage pressure is structural in California. Bad site selection is fixable. Oversaturation may be self-correcting as competitors close too. |
What this means for franchise buyers
The 2026 closure wave is not a franchise apocalypse. It is a portfolio correction after years of over-expansion, cheap capital, and pandemic-era demand distortion. Most closing brands are simultaneously opening new units in better locations with better economics.
The buyer opportunity is specific: closing units create distressed resale inventory, re-opened territories, and reduced competition in local markets. But only if the failure driver is fixable. A closed Wendy's in a declining strip center with a bad lease is not an opportunity. A closed Wendy's on a high-traffic corner where the prior operator undermanaged labor and food cost might be.
Cross-reference closure data with franchisee bankruptcy trends, Section 365 bankruptcy mechanics, franchise distress signals, and private equity roll-up risks to build a complete picture before committing capital.
Bottom line
2,300+ confirmed closures across ten major brands is a buyer intelligence event, not a market collapse. The brands are pruning underperformers. Smart franchise buyers track where the closures happen, why they happened, and whether the territory, real estate, or equipment is available at a discount that reflects the real risk.
Pair this tracker with FDDIQ's casual dining chain crisis guide, franchise development incentives tracker, franchise private equity deal tracker, franchise IPO tracker, ghost kitchen franchise model guide, and franchise due diligence checklist for a complete 2026 franchise market view.